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Khokhar 1
The International Terrorism Tribunal:
The Better Method of Adjudicating Terrorism Cases

Terrorism, through political assassinations, mass killings of civilians, or bombings, has
been a persistent problem throughout history. The tragic events on September 11, 2001 have
elevated terrorism to not just a national, but a global security threat. Non-state terrorist
organizations, such as Al Qaeda, have managed to establish branches in several countries across
the world. Thus, a single organization is now capable of perpetrating attacks around the world.
While the goal of any government would be to punish the individuals responsible for acts of
terror, it is important that in this process of retribution, states do not punish the innocent who
may simply have been in the wrong place at the wrong time. Furthermore, even those individuals
who have in fact committed grave acts of terrorism are nonetheless entitled to the same due
process rights as the innocent in a fair and impartial justice system.
Domestic courts have traditionally adjudicated international terrorism cases. However,
with human rights organizations expressing concern over non-national detainee rights violations
in both the U.S. and abroad, and seeing the struggles that domestic courts have faced in
providing individuals with their proper due process rights, it is time for the international
community to play a larger role in adjudicating terrorism cases. An international terrorism
tribunal will provide suspected terrorists with greater justice, guarantee that their human rights
are preserved and protected, and the process will have greater legitimacy and acceptance.
There are a number of options on how to establish an international tribunal. Tribunals can
be treaty based, ad hoc, which are established by the Security Council, or can be hybrid tribunals,
in which the United Nations works closely with particular state after or during a conflict. To
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have a long-term court with the greatest legitimacy, acceptance and effectiveness, a treaty based
international tribunal to adjudicate terrorism would be the best option in the interest of fairness
and due process for suspected terrorists.
This paper will first examine the problems with the existing judicial structure for
adjudicating terrorism in the domestic setting, particularly focusing on how the United States and
the United Kingdom have tried non-national suspected terrorists. Part II explains the current
types of international tribunals in existence, and their limitations in prosecuting international
terrorism. Part III proposes the jurisdiction, structure, and function of an international terrorism
tribunal. This paper concludes that a new international terrorism tribunal should be established as
a permanent court in which states can bring non-national terrorists to be tried. This court would
borrow aspects of the International Criminal Court, international ad hoc criminal tribunals, and
hybrid tribunals.
I. Problems with Domestic Systems
A. The United States
After the United States invaded Afghanistan, the Bush administration grappled with the
issue of what to do with the individuals captured during the fighting. President Bush ordered the
individuals to be sent to a detention center in Guantanamo Bay.1 The first detainees began
arriving in Guantanamo on January 11, 2002, with some of the men already having been held for
months in Afghanistan.2 Reports of detainee abuse and torture are widespread.3

1

Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 13
November 2001 available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/mo-111301.htm.
2
Amnesty Int’l, Guantanamo: A Decade of Damage to Human Rights, AI Index AMR 51/103/2011 (Dec.16, 2011)
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/guantanamo_10_report.pdf.
3
Id.
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The US quickly looked to establishing military tribunals to try the combatants detained in
the US’s War on Terror.4 Shortly after the US invaded Afghanistan, President Bush issued an
executive order which stated that individuals captured during the fighting would be tried under
military tribunals.5 These tribunals have been at the center of great legal tug-of-war, with the
judiciary striking down the military commissions for their unconstitutionality, and then Congress
passing legislation to legalize them.6
The Military Commissions set up to try the detainees captured in Afghanistan have been
criticized for serious human rights violations, including due process rights, equality before the
law, and right to be free from arbitrary detention.7 The United States’ current method of trying
the detainees in the military commissions violates international law.8 Even under the reformed
Military Commissions, several provisions of the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) including the rights to due process as guaranteed in Articles 9 and 14 have been
violated.9 The articles state that “no one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention.”10
President Bush justified certain individuals’ detention as labeling them enemy combatants under
the laws of war.11 However, more than a decade has passed since the first inmates arrived at
Guantanamo Bay from Afghanistan, and several of these men have not yet been tried.12 In fact,

4

Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 13
November 2001.
5
Id.
6
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
7
Amnesty Int’l, Guantanamo: A Decade of Damage to Human Rights, AI Index AMR 51/103/2011 (Dec.16, 2011)
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/guantanamo_10_report.pdf.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
11
Beth Van Schaack & Ronald C. Slye, International Criminal Law and its Enforcement (foundation press, 2 nd ed.
2010).
12
Guantanamo: 10 years of human wrongs, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 1, 2012,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/guant-namo-10-years-human-wrongs-2012-11-01.
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48 of the men have not even had formal charges brought against them.13 The U.S. is thus denying
the detainees held in Guantanamo Bay with the most fundamental rights that should be afforded
to them under international law. It is far too long for the detainees to still be considered enemy
combatants. As the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are coming to a close, the terror suspects
detention can no longer be considered legal.
Furthermore, groups such as Amnesty International have criticized the US’s disregard of
international guarantees like equality before the law.14 For example, in the case of those captured
in Afghanistan, US nationals would receive a full and fair trial in the ordinary federal criminal
justice system, while non-nationals could be deprived of those privileges due to their national
origin alone since military commissions only apply to foreign nationals.15
A U.S. Army Colonel himself noted that there are “certain gaps that are not present in
other more developed systems” in the military tribunals for detainees.16 One example of a
detainee’s rights being violated is Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s case. After being captured, he
was not brought to a federal court where he had been indicted, but instead put into secret CIA
custody for three and a half years and was subjected to torture and other cruel and degrading
treatment including waterboarding.17
After the Supreme Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in 2006, which ruled that the
Military Commissions were unconstitutional because they were not authorized by a

13

Guantanamo Review Task Force, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et. al. Jan. 22, 2010
Amnesty Int’l, Guantanamo: A Decade of Damage to Human Rights, AI Index AMR 51/103/2011 (Dec.16, 2011)
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/guantanamo_10_report.pdf.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Guantanamo: 10 years of human wrongs, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 1, 2012,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/guant-namo-10-years-human-wrongs-2012-11-01.
14
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congressional act, Uniform Code of Military Justice, or the Geneva conventions,18 the Bush
administration moved Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and 13 other CIA detainees to Guantanamo
Bay.19
On November 13, 2009, Attorney General, Eric Holder, announced that five detainees
including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, would be transferred from Guantanamo to be tried in a
federal criminal court.20 However, this announcement proved to be incredibly controversial as it
created tremendous political debate.21 The Obama administration failed to take immediate action
to transfer the detainees to the U.S. which only prolonged the political contentions.22 On April
14, 2010, in a Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Holder said the administration was
reviewing where to try the detainees and would come to a decision in a matter of weeks. A year
later, on April 4, 2011, the administration ultimately decided that the detainees would be tried
through military commission.23 Thus, the Attorney General’s announcement only demonstrated
the unwillingness of the Obama administration to conduct proceedings in federal courts, and
proved the notion that trial in a federal court was not politically feasible. While federal courts
would be a far better alternative than military commissions in adjudicating terrorism cases, in the
U.S., currently, there simply is not the political will to do so.
Furthermore, the U.S. strongly argues that aliens should be tried in military commissions
so that civilian judges are removed from “military influence or persuasion.”24 In addition, the

18

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006).
Amnesty Int’l, Guantanamo: A Decade of Damage to Human Rights, AI Index AMR 51/103/2011 (Dec.16, 2011)
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/guantanamo_10_report.pdf.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Hamdan at 586.
19
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state argues the commissions protect the public interest as well as facilitate speedy trials. 25 The
U.S. certainly has not provided the detainees with speedier trials through the military
commissions systems. However, the detainees may have concerns that an American system will
not treat them as fairly or be as sympathetic to them as American citizens suspected of terrorism.
While turning to an international court to try terrorists is not something the Obama
administration had embraced or even acknowledged, it is certainly an option it should strongly
consider as it will ameliorate many of the problems the US is facing in its domestic system. It
will strengthen America’s commitment to human rights and show the work that the US respects
and embraces international institutions.
B. The United Kingdom
The United States is not the only country that has faced difficulties in trying suspected
terrorists. Since 9/11 the United Kingdom took a number of steps in attempting to counter
terrorism. The UK did not establish special military tribunals to try suspected terrorist but instead
tried those individuals in civilian criminal courts.26 However, in the process, the British
government also adopted certain laws which, critics argue, severely undermine civil liberties.27
In 1997, the UK established the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC),
whose main role was to hear appeals against the Home Secretary’s decision to deport noncitizens on national security grounds.28 The events of 9/11 brought more suspected terrorists to
such deportation proceedings.29 To this day, SIAC generates great controversy. One of the

25

Id. at 559.
Simon Crowther, The SIAC, Deportation, and European Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 227, 228 (2010).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
26
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biggest issues of contention is the nature of the proceedings.30 After an open session with the
appellant, the court goes into a closed session in which neither the appellant nor his lawyers are
present.31 The rationale for this is that the material discussed by the court is too sensitive to be
entered into the public domain for national security reasons.32 Furthermore, the court requires a
very low burden of proof, just reasonable suspicion, to prove that an individual as a threat to
national security.33 Human rights groups have criticized the low burden of proof stating that it
vastly increases the scope of injustices to occur, in that the state can target innocent individuals
in the course of their investigation.34
A second major flaw with SIAC is that the proceedings are generally conducted with the
intent to deport the appellants to countries that are deemed unsafe by the EU.35 There is often the
risk that individuals will be mistreated when they are returned to certain countries.36 While the
UK argues that it sends the appellants to countries with diplomatic assurances that the deportee
will not be mistreated, it is difficult to know how the detainee is in fact treated unless human
rights groups such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch stay in contact with the
detainee.37 The U.S. has a similar problem of what to do with individuals who have been found
to be non threatening but their home countries will likely subject them to human rights
violations.38

30

Id.
Simon Crowther, The SIAC, Deportation, and European Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 227, 228 (2010).
32
Id. at 228
33
Id. at 228-29.
34
Id. at 229
35
Simon Crowther, The SIAC, Deportation, and European Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE STUDENT L. REV. 227, 227 (2010).
36
Id .
37
Id. at 235
38
Profiles of Guantanamo Detainees in Need of Safe Haven, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
HTTP://CCRJUSTICE.ORG/LEARN-MORE/REPORTS/PROFILES-GUANTANAMO-DETAINEES-NEED-SAFE-HAVEN (LAST
accessed Dec. 1, 2012).
31
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Another example of the UK’s flawed system in dealing with terrorists is a technique it
uses, called the control order system, to prevent terrorism.39 Here, when the UK suspects
individuals of terrorism, it significantly curtails their civil liberties by monitoring the suspects’
actions and invading their freedoms of privacy and movement.40 Targeted suspects are subject to
involuntary relocation to a different town or city in the UK to break up support networks.41 They
must abide by curfews of up to 16 hours, and are further subjected to confinement in a territory,
financial reporting, and restrictions on association and communication.42 All of these restrictions
on civil liberties are performed on individuals who have only been suspected of, and not
convicted of terrorism.43 Like SIAC, when the state reviews these charges, it is done through a
closed material process in which the accused cannot hear the evidence and therefore cannot rebut
it.44 Currently, the control order regime has ended, and the suspects forced to relocate have been
able to return home. The replacement system, T-Pims, involves even greater surveillance of the
new suspects.45
Ultimately, the current systems of adjudication terrorism claims of foreign nationals is
not sufficient as can be seen in the U.S. and U.K. In the U.S., there is deep political opposition to
trying terrorists in federal courts. The current military commissions system violates due process
and international laws. There are far too many men detained still without charges. In the U.K.,
there is again the problem of suspected terrorists not having their due process rights adequately

39

Dominic Casciani, Terrorism control order system ends at midnight, BBC (Jan 24, 2012, 7:37 PM)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16702656
40
Id.
41
Owen Bowcott, UK terror suspects sent into internal exile under control orders, GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2012, 6:06
AM) http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/mar/26/terror-suspects-exile-control-orders/print.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Dominic Casciani, Terrorism control order system ends at midnight, BBC (Jan 24, 2012, 7:37 PM)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16702656
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provided. The surest way to guarantee that individuals will have their due process rights
preserved is to have an international tribunal that can create the proper safeguards and will have
the approval and oversight of the international community to make sure that the trials are being
conducted in a fair and proper manner.
II. Current International Criminal Tribunals
While there are several international courts already in existence, none are appropriate to
tackle terrorism cases in their current state. However, much can be learned from the established
institutions and lessons can be incorporated into creating a new terrorism tribunal.
A. Permanent Courts
The most advanced and enduring international court is the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). However, the Court only has jurisdiction over disputes between states.46 The ICJ could not
hear a terrorism case unless the act of terrorism was state sponsored. Thus, the ICJ could not hear
any of the cases arising out of the actions of individuals who are allegedly members of AlQaeda, for example, which is a non-state actor.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a newer international court. Celebrating its
tenth anniversary November 14, the ICC’s jurisdiction pertains to individuals.47 Persons acting in
their individual, state, or organizational capacity can come before the court.48 Therefore, a
suspected terrorist could potentially come before the ICC. However, the ICC’s jurisdiction is

46

States Entitled to Appear Before the Court, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icjcij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&sp3=a, (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
47
News and Highlights, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC (last accessed Nov.
10, 2012).
48
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/Jurisdiction+and+Admissibility.htm (last visited Nov. 10,
2012).
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limited to the gravest of human rights abuses, which under the current statute do not cover
terrorism.49 In order for the ICC to be able to adjudicate terrorism, the Rome Statute, the treaty
establishing the ICC, must be amended.50 Such an amendment will only be binding on those
states which accept it.51 Also, there are other limits on its jurisdiction. The crimes covered under
the Rome Statute are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression, and there are also temporal and territorial limitations. 52
Interestingly, the initial draft of the Rome Statute did contain a provision including
crimes of terrorism within the Court’s jurisdiction.53 Early drafts in 1998 had states submitting
several definitions for terrorism. Generally, the term was defined broadly but had the elements of
(1) violence against (2) civilian persons (3) to create terror (4) for a political purpose. One such
example in the second proposal to the Rome statute defined terrorism as “in all its forms and
manifestations involving the use of indiscriminate violence, committed against innocent persons
or property intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror, fear and insecurity in the minds of
the general public or populations resulting in death or serious bodily injury, or injury to mental
or physical health and serious damage to property irrespective of any considerations and
purposes of a political, ideological, philosophical, racial, ethnic, religious or of such other nature
that may be invoked to justify it, is a crime.”54
The United States, however, was deeply concerned with the inclusion of terrorism as part
of the ICC’s mandate. From as early as 1995, the U.S. adamantly argued against including
49

United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M 999(5), (1998).
United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M 999(5), (1998).
51
Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role if the International Criminal Court as a Legal
Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 24 (Spring, 2003).
52
United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M 999(5), (1998).
53
Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecuting Terrorism in International Tribunals, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 527, 538
(2010).
54
Id.
50
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terrorism, and drug trafficking in the court’s jurisdiction.55 It stated that as a country that is a
frequent target of international terrorists and drug traffickers, it was concerned that the ICC
could “compromise important, complex, and costly investigations carried out by its criminal,
justice or military authorities.”56 The US feared that the ICC might undermine US investigation
or prosecution of crimes.57 It was also concerned that the ICC might not be able to competently
investigate crimes, or create precise definitions for them.58 The US was hesitant to share highly
sensitive national security information with other states, as being a party to the ICC would
require. 59 Thus, terrorism was ultimately excluded from the Rome Statute, and the ICC does not
have jurisdiction to hear terrorism cases.
As can be seen by the ICJ, ICC, and the UN itself, treaties are the most common method
of establishing large international organizations.60 One hundred twenty one states are parties to
the Rome Statue of the ICC.61 Such a large number of state parties gives the ICC international
legitimacy. However, such a treaty is only binding on those states which are a party. States, such
as the US, who are not party to the Rome Statute are also not bound to its jurisdiction.
While it is possible to expand the ICC’s jurisdiction through an amendment, there are two
major problems to this. Firstly, many states such as the United States would not have jurisdiction
because they are not party to the Court. The problem of the Guantanamo detainees, military
commissions, and prolonged arbitrary detention in the US would still be at large. Secondly, the

55

Id.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecuting Terrorism in International Tribunals, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 527, 535-37
(2010).
60
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law
Commission, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001),
61
The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
56
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ICC only tries individuals responsible of the gravest offenses. Several lower level terror suspects
would not have their cases heard at the ICC. If they did, it would place an incredibly large
burden on the Court as it would be inundated with hundreds of cases of suspected terrorism.
A case may come to the ICC in one of three ways. One, the Security Council may refer a
case to the ICC. Two, a state party to the Rome Statute may refer a case. Third, the ICC
prosecutor may initiate and investigate a case to bring to the Court.62 Furthermore, the ICC
espouses the notion of complementarity, meaning that while the ICC has jurisdiction over certain
issues, domestic courts have jurisdiction over those same issues as well.63 Once the domestic
courts have exhausted their remedies, the case can be brought to the ICC as a court of last resort.
Also, the Court has specialized evidentiary and procedural rules to fit the crimes within the
court’s jurisdiction.64 A single set of procedural and substantive laws are applied to all parties.
This unity ensures greater consistency and legal certainty in the ICC’s decisions.65
Thus, while the ICC is an excellent forum for adjudicating criminals for violating
international law and can lend much to an international terrorism tribunal through its
jurisdictional and procedural rules, it is not sufficient for adjudicating international terrorism. To
include terrorism in the court’s jurisdiction, states would have to amend the Rome Statute, and
still, only states party to the ICC, not including the US, could bring terrorism claims to the court.
Even then, only the most egregious perpetrators of terrorism would be brought to the court,
which would not solve the vast problem of the injustice for the non-nationals suspected of
terrorism in domestic courts discussed above.
62

Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role if the International Criminal Court as a Legal
Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 22 (Spring, 2003).
63
United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 37 I.L.M 999(5), (1998).
64
Richard J. Goldstone & Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role if the International Criminal Court as a Legal
Response to Terrorism, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 13, 22 (Spring, 2003).
65
Id.
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B. Ad Hoc Courts
An ad hoc tribunal is a second type of international court, such as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), established under a UN Security Council resolution.66 The ICTY and ICTR
were international ad hoc tribunals established by the Security Council in, during, or after
conflicts under their Chapter VII powers.67 Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows the Security
Council to take measures to ensure international peace and security.68 While the Council has
generally used Chapter VII powers during a time of armed conflict, the language of the mandate
is broad and maintaining international peace and security might include establishing a tribunal to
maintain peace even when there is not an outright conflict.
After the war in the former Yugoslavia the United Nations decided to play a larger role in
the region’s reconstruction.69 On February 22, 1993, the UN Security Council set up an
international tribunal to prosecute those responsible for violating international law in the area
since 1991.70 In May of 1993, the UN Secretary General submitted a report including proposals
for the effective administration of the Security Council’s decision to establish an international
tribunal.71 By the end of that month, the Security Council, established the ICTY.72 While
Security Council resolutions are generally binding on all states, in the resolution establishing the

66

Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, 61st sess, May 4-June 5, July 6-Aug. 7, U.N. Doc.
A/64/10; U.N. GAOR 64th Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 10, (2009)
67
BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 41 (2d ed.
2010).
68
UN Charter ch. 7 art 39
69
FABIAN O. RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 84 (2008).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
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ICTY, the Council specifically reaffirmed that all states must fully cooperate with the ICTY.73
Part of the ICTY’s mandate specified that while the ICTY and domestic courts would have
concurrent jurisdiction, the ICTY would have primacy over cases.74
Similarly, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994.75 Its statute was similar to the ICTY’s in that it had jurisdiction only
over natural persons and had jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations
of the Geneva Conventions.76
Neither the ICTY nor the ICTR are located in the states in which the atrocities occurred.77
The ICTY is located in The Hague, and the ICTR is in Tanzania.78 While moving the location
may make it more difficult to relocate evidence and witnesses, changing the location
demonstrates the courts’ independence. The courts, nonetheless, are kept close enough to the
target countries so that the populations can feel and sense justice as part of the healing process.79
While the courts are in effect, they have jurisdiction over individuals ranging from the
highest ranking military, political and civilian officials to even lower ranking defendants. 80 In
the winding down process for these courts, the lower ranked defendants can be tried by domestic

73

Id.
Mandate and Jurisdiction, UN ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/320 (Last visited Dec. 1, 2012).
75
FABIAN O. RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 143 (2008)
76
Id.
77
Michael Humphrey, International intervention, justice and national reconciliation: the role of the ICTY and ICTR
in Bosnia and Rwanda 2 J. HUM. RTS. 495, 495 (2003).
78
Id.
79
Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Are Ad Hoc Tribunals an Effective Tool for Prosecuting International Terrorism Cases?,
24 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 515, 519 (2010).
80
BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 41 (2d ed.
2010).
74
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courts.81 Like the ICC, a benefit of such specialized ad hoc tribunals is that the courts are able to
make specialized procedural rules specific to the situation that the UN is facing.82
While ad hoc tribunals are becoming increasingly popular, they have limitations in
adjudicating terrorists. Because they are mandated by the Security Council, the time required to
establish the courts would be far shorter than if it were established by treaty. Furthermore,
because the SC decision would be binding on all states, there would not be an issue of other
states accepting the court’s jurisdiction.83 In these ways, ad hoc tribunals seem like an attractive
option to adjudicate terrorism. However, not all states may be as willing to comply with such a
mandate. The ICTY and ICTR are courts established with limited jurisdiction.84 They deal with
specific crimes in a limited area, over a specific time. Terrorism, while a specific crime, can
occur anywhere in the world and is a continuing problem. States might not be willing to give up
their own procedure for prosecuting suspected terrorists and handing the individuals over to an
international tribunal. While it may indeed be a better way to treat suspects, the states should
decide this for themselves by becoming party to a treaty, not have the Security Council mandate
this on them.
Terrorism is an international crime. Just one organization, Al Qaeda has perpetrated acts
of terrorism in a number of countries including the US, UK, Nigeria, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
If an ad hoc tribunal were to be established, where would it be located? Historically, ad hoc
tribunals have been kept close to the regions where the victims are located so that they have a
sense of justice. But in the case of terrorism, attacks are so widespread that having a single
81

Id.
Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Are Ad Hoc Tribunals an Effective Tool for Prosecuting International Terrorism Cases?,
24 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 515, 518 (2010).
83
FABIAN O. RAIMONDO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN THE DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 84 (2008).
84
Id,
82
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tribunal located close to all the victims is simply impossible. Having a neutral location, like the
ICC in The Hague, for example, would be a better option for an international terrorism court.
Thus, while ad hoc tribunals have been successful and efficient in adjudicating
international crimes, they are too particularized and limited in territorial and temporal
jurisdiction to be able to adjudicate international terrorism effectively.
C. Hybrid Courts
A third type of international tribunal is also the most recent type of tribunal.85 Hybrid
tribunals, also known as second generation ad hoc tribunals, have been established through
Security Council mandates in post-conflict situations such as in Kosovo and East Timor.86 In
Kosovo’s case in particular, the hybrid court was established under a Security Council resolution
to establish the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to maintain
peace and security in the territory in the region.87 The Secretary General was placed in charge of
overseeing the mission.88 This included performing civilian administrative functions such as
maintaining law and order.89
In a hybrid court, international judges work closely with local judges to establish a
system of law and order in the country. The courts are located in the country, and are not
relocated to a different county.90 Because the courts are generally established in post conflict
countries, they are meant to be transitions, where the UN can come in to help the country rebuild
85

BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 161(2d ed.
2010).
86
Laura A. Dickinson, The Relationship between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The Case of Kosovo, 37
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1059 (2003).
87
Id.
88
Gregory H. Fox. HUMANITARIAN OCCUPATION 308 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2008)
89
Id.
90
BETH VAN SCHAACK & RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 161 (2d ed.
2010).
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its justice system.91 The aim is that the country will transition successfully, and the UN will no
longer have to be a presence. While the judges are a blend of national and international, the
lawyers are domestic and the law is reformed to reflect international law.92
In fact, in 2007, the United Nations did establish an international court for the
adjudication of terrorism. This court, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, however, had extremely
limited jurisdiction. On February 14, 2005, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was
assassinated in a terrorist bombing.93 The Lebanese government requested the UN to establish a
tribunal of international character to prosecute the perpetrators of this specific crime, and in May,
2007, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1757 establishing the court.94 However, this
court only applies the domestic Lebanese Criminal Code as substantive law.95 The court does not
have jurisdiction over international crimes.96 Furthermore, the court only has jurisdiction over
crimes solely relating to the attacks on February 14, 2005.97 Thus, while the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon was indeed a court dealing specifically with terrorism, it is far too limited in its
jurisdiction to be an influence in the creation of a permanent tribunal adjudicating international
terrorism.
Another downside to ad hoc tribunals is that they are very expensive undertakings.98
Funds for an ad hoc tribunal can be raised through voluntary contributions or assessed UN
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contributions.99 Collecting funds through voluntary contributions can be very time intensive.100
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, for example, spent a third of its time lobbying governments
for funds, instead of prosecuting criminals.101 Then, because such courts are temporary, funds
must be raised anew once another ad hoc tribunal is established.102
Finally, hybrid tribunals would be the least attractive option to adjudicate terrorism
claims for a long term basis. Where the UN works with a particular country to build up the
judiciary in a hybrid system, here because terrorism is global, it would not be appropriate to
establish a court in just one country.
However, a hybrid tribunal would most likely be the best short term solution for the
suspected terrorists already in detention in Guantanamo Bay. A hybrid tribunal could quickly be
established under Security Council mandate. Those currently held in Guantanamo would be
transferred under international control and their trials would be conducted on neutral, nonAmerican soil.103 Both American and international judges would be appointed to hear the case.104
It would be funded by American and international donors. Such a system would help the US in
particular provide detainees with guarantees of independence and impartiality.105 The biggest
obstacle to this approach is the US’s consent to allow a hybrid tribunal to be set up. A
tremendous lobbying effort would have to take place in Washington to show US leaders that
embracing and not excluding international laws and international solutions would be the best
approach to the current problems related to terrorism. America’s reputation would be enhanced
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in the world by demonstrating its commitment to justice and international law, and it would have
less of a cost in dealing with terrorism crimes.
In conclusion, much can be learned and adopted from the current international tribunals
that have been established through the United Nations. From the ICC, an international terrorism
tribunal can adopt the notion that permanent courts are best established through treaty. It can
borrow and adapt the ICC’s established rules of procedure, evidence and the nuances of
adjudication. However, from the ad hoc tribunals, the court can adopt the notion that the
international court will have primacy over claims. Finally, from the hybrid tribunals, the court
can adopt the practice of adjudicating even lower level crimes.
III. Establishing an International Terrorism Tribunal
A. International law and terrorism historically
The notion of trying terrorism as an international crime is not novel. Long before the
tragic events of 9/11, international terrorism was a grave problem that the international
community felt needed to be addressed. In 1934, King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Louis
Barthou were both assassinated.106 That year, the League of Nations took up the issue of defining
international law regarding terrorism and a committee of experts drafted the Convention on the
Punishment and Prevention of Terrorism, and the Convention for the Creation of an International
Criminal Court.107 A League of Nations conference adopted the two conventions on November
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16, 1937.108 However, India was the only state to actually ratify the Convention on the
Punishment and Prevention of Terrorism.109
The United States again raised the issue of international terrorism in 1972 by submitting a
draft convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International
Terrorism.110 However, the project fared very badly in the UN’s Legal Committee, where
problems of the underlying causes of terrorism bogged down any furtherance on the treaty.111
The attacks on 9/11, shook the international community and spurred action. Even the
more isolationist Bush administration could see that multilateral cooperation would be necessary
to combat the increasingly global problem of terrorism. The US sponsored resolutions in both the
Security Council and the General Assembly on September 12, 2001 which stressed the need for
“all states to work together” and show international cooperation to eradicate terrorism.112
However, this was a brief resolution aimed at condemning terrorism, and did not include a
specific definition of the crime.113
Thus, states agree that terrorism is a grave problem but have not yet defined it, nor have
they come together in a way to combat it. While preventing terrorism is a difficult, complicated,
and controversial prospect, counter terrorism efforts, at this point best, are best dealt with by
domestic authorities. However, deciding what to do with individuals after they have been
suspected of terrorism is something on which states can come together and create a tribunal to
adjudicate those individuals. Because current permanent international courts do not have the
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jurisdiction to hear terrorism cases, establishing an international tribunal for the adjudication of
terrorism would ameliorate many of the problems seen in domestic courts such as the neglect of
international human rights law.
B. Advantages of an international terrorism tribunal
Adjudicating terrorism in an international forum is particularly advantageous for several
reasons. Small states which lack the resources to adjudicate terrorism will find an international
forum particularly helpful. Countries such as Egypt, Algeria, the Philippines, and Russia face
frequent problems with terrorism but lack the ability to put them on trial.114 Similarly, states with
unstable and weak governments will also benefit.115 These governments, such as Columbia, are
often threatened with adverse political consequences or further violence.116 Because of this, the
government at times finds itself resorting to illegal methods such as assassinations.117
An international court will provide a neutral forum for states which would provide a more
effective forum for prosecuting terrorists. It would prevent terrorist from seeking a safe haven in
states which distrust the victim state’s judicial system, do not want to extradite for political
reasons, or are unwilling to prosecute.118 An international court could mitigate the risk of states
acting against international concerns by refusing to extradite or prosecute.119 For example, Libya
initially refused to extradite the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing suspects.120 The benefits of an
international court in that situation would be twofold.121 First, because Libya regarded the U.S. to
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be an enemy, it would assume that the suspects would be found guilty.122 Thus, secondly, a
sentence by an international tribunal would hurt Libya more because it was from a neutral
international body, and not a political foe.123
C. A future terrorism tribunal
International courts can be established through treaty, or through the mandate of an
existing international organization, like the United Nations. As seen in the examples of the
International Criminal Court or the ICTY and ICTR, both are legitimate means of establishing a
court and both methods have been used successfully in history. Establishing a court through
treaty involves a greater number of state parties and involves greater consensus among states, but
is very time consuming and key counties may not sign onto such a treaty. On the other hand, a
tribunal mandated by the Security Council would be a more time efficient process, but only if all
five permanent members of the Council, at least, vote to create such an institution.
Here, establishing a permanent international terrorism tribunal would best be done
through treaty. A treaty would most likely give the court legitimacy as states who are party to the
treaty would be more involved in the court-making process and would be able to include
reservations or make comments to clarify their positions in the court. Like the ICC, a treaty
would give the terrorism tribunal a sense of permanent legitimacy, instead of having a smaller
number of states imposing a court on all states. However, the major downside to a treaty based
tribunal is that key states such as the US or the UK might not become parties to the treaties.
Nonetheless, a treaty based approach to an international terrorism tribunal would be the best
approach, as there would be more legitimacy, permanence, consensus among states, and states
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like the US and UK could be persuaded through political, or reputational concerns to join such a
treaty.
In establishing an international terrorism tribunal through a treaty, the first step would be
to define terrorism in a way in which all state parties can agree. There is some debate as to how
to define this term as the common argument is that one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom
fighter.124 There is a general understanding among states, however, that terrorism includes 1)
violence 2) conducted against civilian targets 3) by subnational or clandestine perpetrators 4)
with a political motivation.125 Thus, a definition that includes these requirements would be
sufficient.
A second difficult issue states must agree upon is how to reconcile domestic laws against
terrorism with international law. For example, the US had held suspected terrorists accountable
for conspiracy and material support for terrorism.126 However, these are not crimes under
international law.127 States can come to an accord on this issue. For example, they can agree to
include material support for terrorism as a crime, however, would ensure that the punishment is
proportional to the crime.
In establishing an international terrorism tribunal, one of the major ways the tribunal
would differ from the ICC is the type of persons the court would have jurisdiction over. Even if
the Rome Statute is amended to include terrorism cases in its jurisdiction, the ICC only hears
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cases involving the most egregious crimes.128 It looks to prosecute the leaders of such crimes.129
The ICC would not hear, for example, Salim Hamdan’s case, who was not a high ranking officer,
but was Osama Bin Ladin’s personal driver.130 Bringing his case to the ICC would not
necessarily bring justice to the thousands of people who died through Al Qaeda’s actions. On the
other hand, trying men like Hamdan is important to make sure that the innocent are not charged
with grave crimes they did not commit, or, alternatively, that even low ranking perpetrators of
terrorism are brought to justice. In this way, a new terrorism tribunal would be more like an ad
hoc tribunal in that the scope of the prosecutions would be broader to include lower ranking
individuals, such as Hamdan.
For procedural matters in the terrorism tribunal, states can look to the ICC for guidance.
The ICC has special rules of evidence, witness protection, testimony and rules of trial that have
been specially tailored to fit the court’s jurisdiction.131 Similarly, an international terrorism
tribunal would have specially tailored rules for terrorism. A terrorism court could even utilize
many of the rules from the ICC, such as those regarding evidence and witness protection. As
seen in the already established international courts, an international terrorism court would grant
suspected terrorists with procedural safeguards. Rules of evidence and detainment would be
established through treaty in a way all countries can agree. Furthermore, because the UN and
international organizations would be involved, the court would comply with international law to
the fullest extent. Therefore, rights such as due process, equality before the law and other rights
guaranteed in the ICCPR would be preserved and protected.
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A major obstacle in establishing a tribunal for terrorism would be the cost. In fact, the
high cost associated with establishing international tribunals is one of the biggest arguments for
supporting domestic adjudication of terrorism.132 But here too, a treaty based system would be
most effective. In that way, the treaty text could establish how and when each member party
pays. Instead of having one country bear the brunt of the costs, or trying to find volunteer donors
as in a hybrid system, parties to the treaty would pay to be part of the tribunal system and keep it
running. In addition, the countries that refer the most cases might be the ones having to pay the
highest dues. For example, if the US were to transfer all 166 of the detainees held in
Guantanamo Bay today133 to an international tribunal to be tried, and the UK only sent 4
individuals, the United States would have to pay for the vast majority of the cost to adjudicate
the men.
While this cost may seem unnecessarily high to the US since it already has an
adjudicative system, the benefits of such an arrangement far outweigh the costs. The US would
have a better reputation for complying with international law. It would be in better compliance
with human rights demands. It could save costs otherwise by shutting down the military tribunals
now in place. Thus, while there are definite monetary costs to an international tribunal, there are
also cost saving benefits, and intangible benefits to a country.
Like other international tribunals, domestic and international courts will have
complementarity. However, the international terrorism tribunal will have primacy over domestic
courts, just as the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals. This will ensure that the detainees’ human rights

132

Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Are Ad Hoc Tribunals an Effective Tool for Prosecuting International Terrorism Cases?,
24 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 515, 516 (2010).
133

The Guantanamo Docket, NEW YORK TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/held (last visited
Dec 1, 2012).

Khokhar 26
and liberties are preserved and protected. Allowing domestic courts to continue trying the terror
suspects would undermine the tribunal’s aim. While domestic courts would still have jurisdiction
to try their own citizens, as is currently done in the U.S. and U.K. where citizens are tried under
the ordinary criminal justice system, foreign nationals should be the individuals brought to the
tribunal. Thus, for example, Shaker Aamer, a U.K. national who is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, but
is held by the U.S. in Guantanamo Bay would be the type of person brought to the international
terrorism court.134
In crafting an international tribunal, not only states, but non-governmental organizations
should also be able to include their input into the treaty making process. During the formation of
the ICC, NGOs played a larger role than at any previous international conference.135 NGOs such
as Amnesty International have not pushed for an international terrorism tribunal, and have
instead focused on improving the current domestic situations for the detainees.136 However, this
might be because they want to help the current detainees receive justice swiftly, instead of
establishing an international tribunal which would take years. However, instead of establishing a
tribunal solely for the purpose of adjudicating current terrorism cases, an international tribunal
should be established to protect the rights of those suspected of terrorism in the future as well.
Thus, even if states do decide to make an international tribunal, domestic institutions must
maintain the effort to improve the human rights conditions of the current detainees.
Thus, in establishing an international terrorism tribunal, much will be borrowed from
existing international courts. The real hurdle is having states come together to form such a
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tribunal. States, like the US, must realize that it is in their own interest to grant terror suspects
neutral and fair trials so that suspects can be afforded their due rights and so that the states can
have a reputation of being true advocates of international law.
Conclusion
Terrorism is a crime that, unfortunately, is likely to last for decades to come. A
permanent court is needed to try those who have been suspected of terrorism. The current
permanent international courts do not have jurisdiction to hear terrorism cases. A new permanent
international terrorism tribunal should be established, keeping in mind the lessons that can be
learned from both permanent and ad hoc international courts. Only then can states successfully
bring suspected terrorists around the world to justice and at the same time preserve their human
rights.

